When social security is established to provide pensions to parents, their reliance upon children for future financial support decreases, and their need to save for retirement also falls. In this study, the expansion of pension coverage from the state sector to the non-state sector in urban China is used as a quasi-experiment to analyze the intergenerational impact of social security on education investments in children. In a difference-in-differences framework, a significant increase in the total education expenditure is found to be attributable to pension expansion. The results are unlikely to be driven by other observable trends. They are robust to the inclusion of a large set of control variables and to different specifications, including one based on the instrumental variable method.
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The old-age security motive for fertility is well recognized in the developing world. In countries where the capital market is underdeveloped and important social welfare institutions are lacking, individuals without insurance and old-age security have the incentive to invest in the future in the form of children (e.g., Cain 1983; Nugent 1987) . 1 As the transfer from children to parents and the survival of parents are both positively correlated with the level of children's education (Cai et al. 2006; Lei et al. 2011; Lillard and Willis 1996; Zimmer et al. 2007) , support in old age may also constitute a motive for providing children with human capital as part of an explicit or implicit intergenerational contract (Pollak 1988; Raut 1990 ) . 2 This old-age security motive for investment in children's education is possibly more credible when the number of children a family can have is limited by strict family planning policies, like those implemented in China. In this case, parents' choice is not on child quantity but on child quality.
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When social security is established to provide pensions to parents in old age, their reliance upon children for future financial support decreases. At the same time, their need to save for retirement also falls. The declining role of children in the support of elder parents and the decreasing need of parents to save may simultaneously influence parents'
decisions to invest in their children's education, but in the opposite direction, the former implies a decline in the investment, but the latter may lead to an increase.
This paper is one of the first studies to assess the intergenerational impact of social security expansion on a family's education expenditures on children. For identification purposes, the one pension reform in urban China is used as a quasi-natural experiment. The reform entails an expansion of pension coverage from employees in the state sector to those in the non-state sector. Employees in the state sector-including those in government agencies, publicly financed social services (e.g., schools, youth organizations, and health care providers), and state-owned enterprises (SOEs)-have long been covered by social security. However, until 1999, non-state employers were not required to enroll their employees in the public pension program (State Council 1999 , 2000 .
In the empirical analysis, a difference-in-differences framework is applied, in which trends in expenditures for the education of children who have a parent employed in the state sector are used to gauge counterfactual trends for what education expenditures would have been for children with both parents in the non-state sector. First, it is demonstrated that other trends-such as those in medical insurance, wages, bonus income, housing ownership and values, working hours, household income per capita and household size-are indistinguishable between the two sectors. Moreover, it is illustrated that determinants of an individual working in the state or non-state sector do not change over time. A statistically significant increase in family education expenditures attributable to the pension reform is then proven. The result is robust to the inclusion of a large set of control variables and to different specifications, including one based on the instrumental variable method.
This paper contributes to the knowledge of motivation for parental investment in children. In Becker's classic model (1974) , parents are altruistic. 4 In later models of bequests (Bernheim et al. 1985) and parental investments in children (Raul 1990) , parents are depicted as making strategic decisions based on expected service or transfers from children. Empirically, some studies support the altruistic motive hypothesis (e.g.,
McGarry and Schoeni 1995), while others question it or show a mixture of altruistic and exchange motives in parents (e.g., Cox 1990) . This study provides new evidence in this inquiry.
This study also relates to the literature on the intergenerational effects of welfare reform on education. Studies of changes in the US national welfare system in the 1990s, aimed at promoting adult employment and reducing long-term dependence on public assistance, have generally yielded positive findings with regard to educational attainment in adolescents (Miller and Zhang 2012) and young children (Duncan and Chase-Lansdale 2001; Morris et al. 2005; Zaslow et al. 2002) . These findings in the United States have advanced the understanding of the effects of social programs on education. One open question remains, however, as to whether these findings can generalize to developing countries, where parents' investment in their children's human capital may be motivated by old-age security. This study provides evidence on this issue from a less-developed country.
In addition, this study advances debate and discussion on the impact of pension provisions in developing countries in general and on pension reform in China in particular. Several studies analyzing the gender-specific impact of old-age pensions in 5 South Africa found that pensions both reduced the labor supply of prime-age individuals and positively affected the nutritional status of children (Bertrand et al. 2003; Duflo 2003) . In contrast, much of the discussion on China has focused on the limitations of the pension system and ways to improve its efficiencies (e.g., Li 2011; Salditt et al. 2008; Zhao and Xu 2002) . Evidence of policy impacts, however, is lacking, with the exception of a recent study that relates higher household savings to pension reform in state-owned enterprises (Feng et.al. 2011 ).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides a review of the cultural and institutional background for elderly support in China. Section 2 presents a simple conceptual framework linking pension coverage for parents and their decisions for investing in their children's education. Section 3 introduces data and reports summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the empirical approach, section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
I. BACKGROUND: ELDERLY SUPPORT AND THE PENSION SYSTEM IN URBAN CHINA
According to Confucian teaching, filial piety is the root of all virtue. The practice of honoring parents, including providing material means of supporting them in old age, is therefore inextricably ingrained in the moral fiber of Chinese society. Since 1950, taking care of the elderly has become more than just an informal social norm: it has been formally codified as a legal obligation for children. 5 Not surprisingly, family was, and 6 still is, the primary care provider of the nursing needs and financial support for the elderly.
6
The traditional role of family in elder care is fraught with new challenges, largely the result of smaller family size and greater labor mobility. The Chinese "one-child" policy, effectively enforced during the past three decades, has reduced family size.
Concerns have been raised about the viability of the family support system because the young can now go anywhere for job opportunities. Parents doubt that filial duty will remain a motivational force for their singletons, and they also worry about the burden of caring for four elderly parents placed upon young couples (Fong 2004) .
Notwithstanding these concerns and the decline of multigenerational coresidence over time, several studies conclude that adult children in China are still responsive to the needs of their parents. Rural children will forgo migration opportunities and stay in their home villages when one or both of their elderly parents are sick (Giles and Mu 2007) .
Urban children provide more monetary transfers to parents when needed (Cai, Giles, and Meng 2006) . More recently, a study based on the new China Health and Retirement
Longitudinal Study emphasizes that living arrangements are such that care from a child, either co-resident or in a nearby community, is readily available for more than 70% of the elderly (Lei et. al. 2011 ).
Compared to family support, private saving is a secondary option for the provision of elders. This option is likely to be viable only for high-income families because small-savers are predominant among the current elderly. In 1995, the value of 6. Under the mode of traditional filial piety in China, sons are responsible for the care of elderly parents. As shown in Ebenstein and Leung (2010) , parents without a son are more likely to participate in old-age pension programs in rural areas.
7 financial assets was less than half the annual earnings for 53% of the urban population aged fifty-five or older (Jackson and Howe 2004) . The percentage of households with wealth-to-income ratios of more than two at retirement is predicted to remain small in the future (Takayama 2002) . However, with housing boom in urban cities since the early 2000s, housing is likely to become the biggest source of wealth for urban residents.
While such assets may have limited liquidity, they still can be leveraged to finance consumption if needed.
The third source of old-age income is the social pension. Since the early 1950s, urban residents who worked in government, government-sponsored nonprofit institutions, and SOEs have been entitled to social security, including pension coverage. Economic restructuring in SOEs eventually relieved the enterprises from the burden of providing social security for their employees. This change was made possible by several policy reforms. In 1991, following experiments in a number of provinces and municipalities, the State Council outlined the first major pension reform. 7 The idea was to promote the integration of pensions for enterprise workers at the provincial level. The social pooling remained a "pay-as-you-go" (PAYG) system, in which mandatory contributions from enterprises and payroll taxes from workers were collected to pay retirees.
With concerns about PAYG system sustainability for a rapidly aging population, further reform of the pension system for enterprise workers was initiated in the mid- by industries or localities-were also encouraged (Barr and Diamond 2010) .
Although employees of SOEs were covered by the system described above, coverage for workers outside the state sector was very limited. To facilitate SOE reforms, as well as to improve the financial balance of the pension program, the next step in pension reform was to expand the pension pool and encourage contributions from employers and workers in the non-state sector (Zhao and Xu 2002) . In 1999, the State
Council called for acceleration of the inclusion of non-state enterprise workers into the pension pool (State Council 1999) , and included in the non-state enterprises were collective, foreign-invested, private, and other types of enterprises. Since then, pension coverage in non-state enterprises has increased, even though it remains far lower than in the state sector due to non-compliance (Zhao and Xu 2002) .
Public employees are covered by a different system that depends not on worker contributions but rather on benefits based on a short period of earnings at the end of a career (Barr and Diamond 2010) . Compared to the pension program for enterprises, the system for public employment has undergone little change.
In sum, employees in the state sector, including SOEs and the public sector, have always been entitled to pension coverage, even though the structure of the pension 9. In 2001, individual contribution rates in Fuzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Xian, the five cities under study in this paper, were 2%, 6%, 8%, 5%, and 6%, respectively. 
where ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and is the weight the parents place on the child's welfare. The child's level of well-being is assumed to be a function of his or her education ( ), and 0, 0, and 0.
In period one, the parents use their monetary income ( ) for family consumption, child education ( ), mandatory pension contributions ( ), and saving ( ). In period two, their consumption is determined by their saving, pension income ( ), and net transfer from their child ( ). Assume the return on saving is . Let the pension income be based upon the mandatory contributions ( ), augmented by a parameter ( ), mainly to capture the fact that employers contribute to the pension fund as well. It follows that and . The transfer is a linear function of the child's education, that is, .
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The parameter , assumed to be exogenous in the model, essentially measures parents' perceived private return to education and can be positive, zero, and negative. The case that γ 0 is not unlikely to occur for two reasons. First, the educated young people have higher labor mobility and thus may be less attached to their parents, giving less oldage support particularly in terms of instrumental care. Second, being an only child as a result of the one-child policy is associated with being less trustworthy and less conscientious (Cameron et al. 2013 ). Higher mobility of the more educated and the behavior traits of the young may leave parents with less expectation for old-age support from their children, resulting in γ possibly being zero or even negative.
The budget constraints for parents are (2) and (3) The maximization solution yields the following equations:
where the partial derivatives of the utility functions are denoted by superscripts. This intertemporal first-order condition in equation (4) dictates the trade-off between and is such that the utility loss of one unit reduction in is equal to the present value of the utility gains from one unit increase in for time two. The utility gains include the net gain from the consumption change due to transfer ( ) and the gain due to an increase in the child's welfare ( ). Similarly, equation (5) shows the utility trade-off between saving and education expenditure.
The effects of expanding pension coverage (change in ) on is studied by applying the implicit function theorem to equation (4) and obtaining the following comparative statics:
In this equation, denotes how parents' marginal utility of consumption changes with a child's welfare. It is reasonable to assume it is nonnegative ( 0). Given the concavity of the utility functions, it is clear that 0, 0, 0 , and 0.
With this general framework, three cases are examined, each of which uniquely defines parental motives in investing in the education of their child:
Case 1. Parents only have exchange motives. The child's well-being carries zero weight in their parents' utility function (α 0 , but, if possible, the parents will rely on the child's transfer for consumption in the later period (γ 0). Given equation (5), it is easy to see that when the perceived return to education is not as high as the market interest rate (γ ), parents will not invest in their child's education, that is 0. This decision will not be affected by pension coverage.
When γ R, parents would choose to invest in their child's education ( 0).
The comparative statics in equation (4) reduces to:
Therefore, it follows that 0. This prediction implies that if nonaltruistic parents invest in their child's education at all, an access to future pension income would reduce parents' education expenditure.
Case 2. Parents are altruistic and have no exchange motives. So they value their child's well-being (α 0) but don't expect to receive positive transfer from children in period two (γ 0). In this case, the sign of , as given in equation (6), is undetermined.
The model thus cannot predict how education spending changes with the expansion of pension coverage if parents act purely altruistically.
Case 3. Parents care about their child's welfare (α 0), but they also depend on the child for consumption in period two (γ 0 . The change in with respect to the change in is the same as given in equation (6). Hence the sign of is also undetermined.
In summary, the model unambiguously predicts that nonaltruistic parents decrease additional spending may also reflect a peer effect in that with only one child, parents "compete" to invest in their children in order to enhance labor and marriage market competitiveness (Wei and Zhang 2011) . In addition, both elite urban private schools and the public embrace the belief that extracurricular activities can help foster self-confidence in children and stimulate their interest in learning (Lin 2007) .
With regard to pension coverage for parents, the numbers show that 55% of the mothers and 67% of the fathers were enrolled in an employer-based pension program in (figure 1). They average around 80%, with older employees having higher coverage rates.
For the non-state sector, the average rates jump from about 40% to a little over 60%. The increase applies to employees of all ages. It also applies to workers in all types of 14. Hukou status (rural vs. urban) at age of sixteen may account for variations in the quality of education the parents had because urban schools are generally better than rural schools (e.g., Paine and Fang, 2007) . The residence place at age of sixteen, together with the current Hukou status, captures whether parents have local roots and thus have access to a family support system locally.
enterprises in the non-state sector (figure 2). On average the workers in the foreigninvested firms had the highest pension coverage of 64% to begin with, and it further increased to 79% in 2005. The workers in the private enterprises enjoyed the largest increase in pension coverage from about 20% to 70%. A moderate increase from 62% to 70% is observed among workers in collective enterprises.
IV. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
As outlined in the conceptual framework, pension availability may have opposing effects of investments in children's education; therefore, its net effect is inherently an empirical question. In this section, the empirical strategies for identification are explained, followed by a discussion of the data.
Main Identification Strategy
Considering that the pension coverage rate was never close to 100%, it is very possible that there were effects that operated through the expectation of being able to enroll in the public pension system, such as reductions in savings and increases in expenditures for those in the non-state sector during the period. The focus here is on reduced-form/intent-to-treat estimates. The net effect of pension expansion on parents' investments in their children's education is estimated in a difference-in-differences (DD) framework:
where denotes the education investments in child i in city c at time t. The variable is a binary variable indexing whether two parents are currently or last employed in the non-state sector. 15 The post pension reform trend 2005 is estimated using children whose parent(s) is employed in or retired from the state sector.
The treatment effect of pension reform is measured by the coefficient ( on the interaction between and the post reform trend. is a vector of child characteristics, including age, gender, and school level.
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A vector of parental characteristics and family background is denoted by .
The inclusion of parents' family background as controls is important in mitigating a potential omitted variable bias in the estimation. For example, if the academic ability of a child is positively correlated with the amount of investment made by parents, an upward bias would result if ability is inheritable and high-ability parents are more likely to work for employers who enroll in the public pension program. In addition, parents' local roots may be related to which sector they work in and their child care decisions. Therefore, parents' Hukou status and residence location at the age of sixteen, their current Hukou status, and their own parents' education are all included as control variables, additional to their age and education. In addition, the city-specific year dummies ( ) are included to control for city-specific policy changes during this period. For example, the contribution rates for pensions changed during this time and varied across cities. The idiosyncratic error term is denoted by .
15. The non-state sector includes three types of enterprises: collectively owned or controlled enterprises, privately owned or controlled enterprises (with 8 or more employees), and foreign-owned or controlled enterprises. The expansion of urban employee pension program applied to employees in theses types of enterprises. The state sector includes government agencies, social service units (e.g., schools, youth organizations, and health care providers), and state-owned or controlled enterprises. We exclude observations with two self-employed parents. For children with one self-employed parent, the sector is defined by the sector of the parent who is not self-employed. 16. The vast majority of the children are the only child of their family. In our sample, the average number of siblings is 0.084. Given the small variation in the number of siblings, we don't include this variable in the regressions. But the results are robust to including the variable.
An Alternative Identification
To provide additional robustness checks to the estimation results of equation (8) V. RESULTS
17.
We have access to 20% of the observations in the total sample, and they account for 0.95% of the Chinese population.
.18 There are eight categories for employer types in the 2005 population survey: land contractor, government agencies and social service units, state-owned or controlled enterprises, collective enterprises, the self-employed, private enterprises, other enterprises, and others. We exclude the land contractor category and combine "other enterprises" and "others" in the calculation. 19. Others have used prevailing averages as instrument variables in previous studies on health insurance in the US (e.g., Cutler and Gruber 1996; Gruber and McKnight 2003) .
The SOE reforms that de-link the social services from individual employers also changed other employee benefits. Therefore it is important to first check that trends in other observable factors than pension coverage do not differ between the two sectors.
Trends in Related Employee Benefits and Other Variables in the Two Sectors
The medical reform in 1997 involves establishing a unified "urban employee basic health insurance scheme" and widening coverage of health insurance for the urban employed (Liu 2002 20 . Changes in expected future housing wealth may also influence the household's education expenditure through intertemporal budget constraint. We don't have enough information to examine expected future wealth and its changes across state and non-state workers. But our data suggest that workers in the state sector were more likely to have older and smaller housing unit, built and previously owned by their work unit, than workers in the non-state sector. Compared to housing units later built by real estate developers, the housing units built by state-owned factories or organizations before the housing reform (in 1994) were more likely to be demolished. Therefore, workers in the state sector seemed to be better positioned to benefit from significant payout when their homes were scheduled for demolition. So it is likely that the expected housing wealth is higher for workers in the state sector. This would bias against finding the result that parents in the non-state sector spend more over time on education. The descriptive statistics of housing characteristics by sector are reported in table S1 of the supplementary appendix. changes in education investment over time between parents working in the two sectors would be caused by the outcomes examined in table 2.
Main Results from the DD Estimations
The estimates of the overall effects of pension reform on education expenditure are reported in table 3. The top panel contains results for the logarithm of the total education expenditure, and the lower panel shows whether or not the child had tutors or participated in extracurricular classes.
Results from the basic difference-in-differences model, including the full set of city and year fixed effects are shown (table 3) . Pension reform is associated with an increase in education expenditure, but the estimate is not statistically significant. In the next column, the estimate is 0.106, significant at the 1% level, with additional controls for child age, gender, and school level. The result shows that, compared to education expenditure for children with one parent in the state sector, education expenditure for children with two parents in the non-state sector has an increase of 10.6% during this period. Specification is further augmented with parents' individual characteristics and their family backgrounds as covariates, including parents' age and education (column 3), parents' Hukou status (column 4), and, finally, grandparents' education (column 5). With this extensive list of covariates, the impact estimate ranges from 8.5% to 11.5%, all significant at the 5% level.
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The results of tutoring and extracurricular classes are sensitive to the inclusion of different controls. However, the estimate remains significant at the 5% level with the full set of controls, showing that over time the likelihood of having tutors and attending 21. The regression results are robust to the inclusion of three additional variables as controls: the number of siblings of the child, the number of mother's siblings, and the number of father's siblings.
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special interest classes is 6.5 percentage points higher for children with parents in the non-state sector than for children with a parent in the state-sector.
When examining the effects on two components of the total education expenditures: tuition and school fees, and tutors and extracurricular classes (table 4), it is found that, with the full set of controls, the impact coefficient for tuition and fees is not significantly different from zero. Note that the specific public schools attended by the K-9 children are based mainly on the school district of their residence. With the implementation of the "one fee" system, the amount of tuition and school fees is capped in the public schools; thus, it is not surprising that no impact is found on tuition and school fees. The estimated impact on expenditures on tutors and extracurricular classes is large in magnitude (about 47%) 22 and significant at the 5% level. These results imply that the rise in total education expenditure occurs primarily because of increased participation in and expenses on educational activities outside regular schools.
Trends in other benefits-health insurance policy, wage, bonus income, working hours, housing values, etc.-have been shown to be essentially the same for both state and non-state sectors. Therefore, the observed impact on education expenditure for children whose parents are employed in the non-state sector cannot be driven by any of these factors. With the large set of control variables included in the regressions, it can be concluded that the effects found on education investments can be ascribed to the expansion of pension coverage to the non-state sector. 
Could the Results be Driven by State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Restructuring?
In the mid-1990s, the SOEs underwent various reforms. Given that the more educated and younger victims of the SOE restructuring were more likely to be reemployed (Giles et al. 06b Beginning in the late-1990s, one means of shedding workers from the state sector during the enterprise reform was to allow them to retire early. 24 As it is not uncommon for early-retirees to return to work, in the 2005 sample, there may be cases where a worker was a former retiree, collecting pension from the state sector while working in the non-state sector. To address this concern, the observations with mothers being older than forty are dropped, and the model is re-estimated using a much smaller sample, and the results remain similar.
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Finally, a related concern regards pension wealth. A 1997 pension reform (State Council 1997) reduced pension wealth of employees of SOEs, who were offered lower replacement rates than before (Salditt et al. 2008; Sin 2005) . The decline in pension wealth is found to be associated with higher savings and reduced expenditures on children's education and health in the late 1990s (Chamon et al. 2010; Feng et al. 2011 ).
If such effect still exists during 2001-2005, it would be wrong to attribute the observed increase in education investment to change in pension coverage in the non-state sector.
To allow for the potential impact on children with parents employed in SOEs, an additional "treatment" group of children with parents in SOEs is created. The results based on this new specification (table 6) show that education expenditures on children with parents in SOEs are no different than for children in the control group, whose parents are employed in government or related organizations. The results further confirm 24. Giles et al. (2006) documents that nearly 40% of women between the ages of forty and forty-nine who lost employment during the SOE restructuring were able to retire and receive pensions. 25. The results are reported in appendix table S4. The results on total education expenditure show that, compared to education expenditure for children with one parent in the state sector, the expenditure for children with two parents in the nonstate sector increases by 19% during this period. The increase in total education expenditure seems to be driven by more spending on tutoring and interest classes, a finding consistent with the results from the total sample. The impact on having tutors, though, is no longer significant. These results are likely to reflect the impacts on younger children, as the average age of children in this sample is 8.9 years versus 12.1 years in the total sample.
that the observed impact is likely to be driven by the change in pension coverage. One possible reason that the impact of changes in pension wealth are not found in the data might be that the reform affecting pension wealth started in 1997 and the "shock"
induced by the reform is likely to be strongest shortly after the reform, for example in 1999 as studied in Feng et al. 2001 , but its impact may abate during [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] .
Could Change in School Quality and Expansion of College Enrollment Explain the Results?
Another concern is that, over time, children whose parents are in the non-state sector may no longer have equal access to quality schools; therefore, their parents would be more likely to invest in after-school tutors in the later years. If that were true, what has been identified would be driven by the differential change in school quality available to the two sectors. To examine this issue, the impact is estimated separately for children whose parents do not have a college degree and for those who have at least one collegeeducated parent. If the results were driven by deteriorating school quality for the nonstate sector, then it might be that parents in the non-state sector-particularly those with higher levels of education-spend more for tutors and extracurricular classes over time.
However, if the results were driven by income effects brought forth by increased coverage in the non-state sector, then the effect would be more pronounced for families with tighter budget constraints. If income effect dominates, a larger impact on children whose parents are relatively less educated is expected to be observed.
With the stratified sample, it is found that the pension reform has no effect on children with more-educated parents or from families less likely to be budgetconstrained. The impact estimates remain significant for children whose parents are 26 relatively less-educated, and they are substantial in magnitude. These results imply that the possible differential access to quality schools by sectors cannot explain the results.
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With the increase in the university enrollment, particularly since 1999, the chance for high school students of going to college is increased by about 13% according to Li and Xing (2010) . So it is likely that parents with less expectation of enrolling children in college in 2001 started to believe that college enrollment was now possible. If the expansion of educational opportunities at the college level had a strong effect on parents working in the non-state sector, then this might be reflected in the main results. To investigate if the results are driven by the increase in university enrollment during the time, the sample is stratified by child age into groups (pre-school age 1-5; elementary and middle school age 6-15; high school age 16-18). 27 If the better prospect of going to college was the major motivation for the observed increase in education expenditure, it is expected that the effect on children of high-school age would be the same, if not bigger, than the effect on younger children. However, the results show that the effect is not significant for high-school age children but significant for younger children. The results suggest that the expansion of college enrollment is unlikely to be an alternative explanation of the main results.
Results from the IV Estimates
Finally, the estimates are presented based on the alternative identification with the instrumental variable (IV) method as outlined in equation (9). In this estimation, whether or not at least one parent has enrolled in the public pension program is directly controlled for, using the average enrollment rates for the parents' age/education/gender/employer 28 policy change significantly increases the total education expenditure and suggests that in urban China parents' spending on children's human capital cannot be entirely driven by an old-age security motive but is likely to be motivated by the altruistic concern for their children.
At the same time, the results also imply that without access to public pension, altruistic parents do have to face the trade-off between savings for old-age and education spending on children. With the expansion of pension coverage, more parents are able to spend more on education. The evidence presented in this paper shows that social security reform affects intergenerational transfers in the form of education investment.
Assessment of the impact of social security reform would be amiss if it did not include such intergenerational effects. With the basic pension system gradually being established in rural China, it would be interesting to examine the effects in the rural areas where arguably the role of family in elder care is traditionally stronger. Data source: CULS1 and CULS2. State sector includes government agencies, publicly financed social services (e.g., schools, youth organizations, and health care providers), and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The non-state sector includes collectively owned or controlled enterprises, privately owned or controlled enterprises (with 8 or more employees), and foreign-owned or controlled enterprises. Note: Self-employed individuals (including family workers) and individuals working in firms with fewer than eight employees are not included in the analysis. Other variables included but not reported are age, years of schooling, city fixed effects, and city-specific time dummies. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are clustered by city, year, and employers' ownership type. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are clustered by city, year and employers' ownership type. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are clustered by city, year, and employers' ownership type. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. The pension variable measures whether or not at least one parent is covered by a public pension program; it is instrumented by two variables: mother's probability of enrolling in public pension program and father's enrollment probability. The probabilities are predicted from a sample consisting of 20% of the observations of the 2005 Chinese national intercensal population survey, based on the city of residence, age, education level, and employer's ownership type. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are clustered by city, year and employers' ownership type. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. 
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